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Managing Design and Designers for Strategic Renewal 
 
Abstract 
In this article, we propose a framework for understanding how design and designers may contribute 
to strategic renewal in producers of traditional and hi-tech consumer durables. Building on a study of 
outstanding innovators in product design, we describe design-driven renewal as a four-phase process 
stimulated and supported by design, combining continuous product innovation with the periodic 
revision of the strategic course of the company. For each phase, we discuss the specific role of 
managers and the most common pitfalls that arise from poor management of the process.  
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 “The Domestic Appliances division of Philips is a good example of a business that has made 
innovation through design part of its day-to-day practice (Laura Taylor, Philips Design).” 
Introduction 
In 1994, giant conglomerate Philips forged a partnership with Italian kitchenware producer Alessi to 
jointly develop a range of small appliances. The new products – a fruit-juice squeezer, a kettle, a 
toaster and a coffee machine – pioneered a new trend in the design of home appliances, based on 
soft rounded lines, pastel colours, and velvet textured finishes. Natural shapes and imaginative names 
helped new products appeal to emerging needs for affection and domesticity in the consumers’ 
relationship with the machines. These products soon became design icons, positioning Philips as a 
design leader in home appliances. According to Stefano Marzano, chief design manager at Philips, 
the Philips-Alessi line did not merely indicate a new style direction, but reflected an innovative 
approach to the exploration of consumers’ latent needs and to the use of technology in consumer 
products, triggering a change in the way managers at Philips looked at design. During the eighties, 
under the leadership of former design manager Robert Blaich, design was considered primarily as a 
competitive tool to increase the commercial appeal of new products. Later, Marzano’s work 
emphasized the potential role of design in driving brand repositioning and inspiring strategy 
formulation.  
Philips is not a unique case. In the last decade, scholars have documented the rising centrality 
of design and designers in large corporations and small firms, and observed how competitors in 
different industries have built or reinforced excellent competitive positions through renewed 
attention to product design1. Bold, innovative, lifestyle-oriented product design, for instance, played 
a substantial part in the rise of Nokia and Sony among the most valuable global brands, and in the 
revitalisation of high-tech brands like Philips and Apple. Even relatively small competitors like 
Alessi, audio-video producer Bang & Olufsen and furniture-maker Kartell carved out profitable 
niche positions thanks to the relentless exploration of new conceptual and formal solutions.  
In part, the increasing relevance of design may be explained by the increasing role of culture 
and lifestyles in affecting consumers’ decisions2. Clothing, transportation, food and beverages, home 
furnishings, personal accessories, and even consumer electronics and sports have become means for 
expressing cultural meanings and signalling social identity3. As the changing patterns of consumption 
increasingly shift the field of competition, even companies that used to compete primarily on price 
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or technological performance are increasingly facing the need to develop products that are not just 
efficient or reliable, but also responsive to emerging lifestyles and cultural values4.  
Since the mid nineties, we have studied cases of success, failure, decline and renewal (or, 
occasionally, the other way around) in traditional and high-tech consumer goods industries, in which 
substantial changes in product design promoted or supported changes in the strategic course of the 
company (see table 1, and Appendix A for a summary of our methodology). In this article, we build 
on findings from our study to develop a conceptual framework for understanding how managers 
may harness the contribution of design and designers along the process of strategic renewal. In the 
following sections, after having briefly reviewed extant conceptions of strategic renewal, we propose 
a model of design-driven renewal, conceived as a process of continuous product innovation and 
periodic revision of the strategic course of the company stimulated and supported by design.  
---------------------------------- 
insert table 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Current perspectives on strategic renewal 
Research on strategic change and renewal suggests that adaptation to broad environmental changes – 
such as the cultural trends and changing customers’ preferences we have mentioned in the 
introduction – requires firms to reconfigure the way they combine resources and capabilities into 
their products and services5. Scholars, however, seem to share different views about how renewal 
actually occurs. 
Current literature on strategic renewal tends to cluster around two alternative conceptions. 
Some scholars conceive strategic renewal as a set of activities that a firm undertakes to substantially 
alter its resource pattern and strategic course, in order to improve its overall economic performance6. 
We may call this perspective renewal as corporate transformation, in order to underline the pervasive 
effects that such process has on the strategy, structure, systems and culture of a firm. These scholars 
observe how increasing environmental hostility or a deteriorating competitive position may induce 
managers to initiate a renewal process, searching for a more favourable combination of existing 
resources and capabilities, and to foster organization-wide proactive behaviour. In rare cases, 
strategic renewal may even get to the point of inducing transformation in the industry itself, altering 
patterns of competition in a significant way.  
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While most scholars embracing this perspective seem to acknowledge the purposive nature 
of the process and the fundamental role of corporate leaders in starting and driving the process, they 
tend to diverge over the time-frame of the process. Early research on corporate transformation 
supported a view of strategic renewal as a rapid, discontinuous process, involving simultaneous 
changes in strategy, structure, power and control systems7. Research findings supported the idea that 
successful firms evolve through long periods of stability, punctuated by short episodes of radical 
change8. Recent developments of this perspective, however, suggest the existence of a plurality of 
paths that top managers may follow in their effort to promote a corporate-wide transformation, and 
observed how strategic renewal in mature business is often a long-term, incremental process, rather 
than a relatively rapid shift from one configuration to another9.  
Scholars embracing a second perspective – focused on product innovation and business 
development – describe strategic renewal as the effect of a relentless search for new combinations of 
available technologies, underpinned by the creation and exploitation of product and market 
knowledge10. They observe how strategic change emerges from internal experimentation occurring in 
product and business development teams. We may call this conception renewal as continuous innovation, 
emphasizing its two essential features: (i) being driven by technology and product innovation, rather 
than by corporate-wide change efforts, and (ii) being carried out on a permanent basis.  
Proponents of this perspective observe how strategic renewal is continuously, and at times 
unintentionally, stimulated by development projects that explore new business opportunities. Top 
managers may deliberately initiate some of these projects; others, however, may arise spontaneously, 
as people experiment with different combinations or applications of existing capabilities and 
technologies. All projects generally compete for available resources. The results of this competition 
depend on how administrative and cultural mechanisms channel attention, resources and rewards to 
different units, and on the selection process carried out by top managers as they assess the 
consistency of proposals with existing resources and the current strategic goals11. Over time the 
strategic course of the company is gradually modified by the interplay of strategic initiatives and the 
selection process, and the renewal process is carried out by the continuous upgrade of technologies, 
the revision of product lines and the redefinition of the business portfolio. Whereas advocates of 
corporate transformation seem to conceive renewal as a purposive process with a beginning and an 
end, albeit roughly defined, scholars embracing this second perspective emphasize the role of 
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experimentation in relentlessly promoting an upgrade of a firm’s offerings and adjustments to its 
strategic intent. 
At first, these views seem to be describing different phenomena occurring in rather different 
contexts. Whereas studies embracing the first perspective tend to focus on large, mature 
corporations facing broad changes in their competitive landscapes, the second draws largely on 
research on high-technology firms in dynamic environments, where continuous innovation is spurred 
by intense competition and fast-paced technological change. Our research, however, suggests that 
both perspectives may be needed to properly understand the potential contribution of design and 
designers to strategic renewal. In fact, in the cases we analyzed, continuous innovation and corporate 
transformation appeared as outcomes of different stages of a broader process of renewal based on 
organizational and product development activities. 
Design-driven renewal: a conceptual model 
Design-driven renewal can be described through a four-phase model, based on two interrelated 
processes fostering changes first at a product level (phases 1 and 2) and later at organizational level 
(phases 3 and 4). The two processes feed upon each other, as successful product innovation may 
inspire an overall organizational development centred on the revision of design principles and 
strategic intent, which in turn will later affect how product innovation is carried out in design centres. 
Table 2 summarizes the content of the four phases. Taken together, these phases describe an overall 
process of strategic renewal initiated and supported by designers’ activity, which is illustrated and 
discussed in this section. 
---------------------------------- 
insert table 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
At Bang & Olufsen, Nokia, Apple and other companies we analysed, designers tend to have a pre-
eminent role in driving product innovation by continuously exploring new applications for available 
resources and capabilities. The generation of new ideas represents the fist phase of the renewal process, 
where potential variations to the current offerings are submitted to the attention of managers. 
Experimentation carried out by internal and external designers nurtures a continuous process of 
product development resulting in periodic renewal and extension of product lines and features. 
Designers’ concepts and proposals generally reflect a set of principles of design – what we could call 
a “design philosophy” (see Appendix B) – which orient and stimulate their work and influence the 
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search for and the development of new concepts and forms. Designers, however, may also 
occasionally depart from established principles, in order to explore or to test new approaches to 
design.  
The evaluation of designers’ proposals represents the second phase of the renewal process. 
Although managers may not be heavily involved in the generation of new ideas, they usually exercise 
the right of approving or rejecting designers’ proposals. The evaluation and selection of new ideas follows 
criteria which may vary across companies, but usually include expected costs and revenues, and fit 
with existing product lines, organizational features (technological competencies, current suppliers, 
distribution channels, etc.) and policies (positioning, pricing, etc.). As criteria may vary, so does the 
actual involvement of managers from different functions (marketing, operations, etc.) and 
hierarchical levels (top, middle, local, etc.). Some ideas may be discarded because of lack of fit, others 
because they are judged too bold and risky. Others, however, receive funding for further 
development and some of these are eventually put in production and commercialized. Eventually, 
therefore, the way this internal selection process is carried out heavily influences change and variety 
in product lines.  
The interaction between managers and designers occurring during these two phases affects 
the evolution – or inertia – of product lines. At this level, renewal tends to occur gradually and 
mostly within the boundaries of current strategy and design philosophy, as environmental feedback 
reinforces confidence in the principles underlying product design or indicates opportunities for 
incremental adjustments. From time to time, however, more pronounced variations of existing 
concepts and principles may be introduced in product design. Positive and substantial market 
feedback on some of these products may challenge widespread interpretations of the external 
environment and activate a process of organizational development, resulting in changes in the 
principles guiding product development and, at times, in the very strategic course of the company12. 
At times, then, renewal may extend from the product level to the organizational level, as 
feedback from the market induces managers and designers to question the validity of their beliefs 
about market segmentation, user needs, cultural values, etc. This phase may be triggered by the 
unexpected success – or by the persistent lack of – of a firm’s new products, which leads managers 
to urge a revision of the design philosophy of the firm (phase 3). A revision of goals and principles driving 
product innovation is expected to promote or facilitate a redefinition of the strategic intent of the 
company or a reconfiguration of its competitive scope.  
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The completion of the renewal process, however, requires managers – and at times designers 
alike – to engage in purposeful attempts to diffuse the new design principles, propagating awareness of the 
new design philosophy beyond the boundaries of design centres and corporate headquarters, in order 
to align action of external or peripheral actors such as advertisers, distributors, and freelance 
designers with the strategic intent and the design philosophy of the company (phase 4). What started 
as a more or less substantial variation in product design eventually results in an organization-wide 
renewal in values, beliefs, and strategic positioning.  
The substantial role played by design and designers throughout the process led us to define 
the resulting model design-driven renewal. However, our research indicates also that the way the process 
is managed is crucial to its success. In the following sections, we will use evidence from our study to 
illustrate more in details the four phases and to discuss their implications for managers guiding the 
process13. Critical managerial tasks are summarized in tables 3, 4, 5 and 6, along with further 
illustrative evidence of how managers contributed to promote renewal in the cases we analysed. 
Phase 1: Generation of new ideas 
Design-driven renewal is triggered by designers exploring ideas for new combinations of formal and 
functional features embodied in new products. Not all the ideas for new products may introduce 
radical variations in existing product lines. Designers’ decisions about concepts, shapes, materials, 
functions, and packaging tend to be guided by mental frames through which they interpret problems 
and evaluate the appropriateness of alternative solutions with respect to the objectives to be achieved 
and their own system of values14. We may call these frames of reference a design philosophy – an 
internally coherent set of beliefs and principles about how, why and for whom products should be 
designed (see Appendix B).  
While these beliefs evolve over time, they tend to preserve a connection with the heritage of 
the company and often bear the imprint of a visionary chief designer – people like Jacob Jensen at 
Bang & Olufsen or Stefano Marzano at Philips – whose personal ideas and values came to influence 
the way products were developed and designed by internal and external designers15. Building on these 
principles, many projects may be simply aimed at expanding product lines, with minor alterations in 
size, performance, and other features. Other projects, however, may purposefully explore new 
concepts, new elements of style or innovative functions16.  
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In most companies we observed, managers’ direct involvement in the generation and 
development of new ideas was occasional. Nevertheless, managers played an important role even at 
this stage in providing a favourable context for designers’ activity, by emphasizing the strategic 
relevance of design, legitimating the role of designers in early phases of the development process, 
and preserving their autonomy from premature interference from other functions (see table 3).  
---------------------------------- 
insert table 3 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
Establishing the strategic relevance of design. Some companies tend to involve industrial 
designers only in later stages of product development, merely in order to give an appealing form or 
package to a combination of technologies whose features have already been determined by marketers 
and engineers. Such behaviour may be symptomatic of an implicit lack of confidence in the 
innovative potential of design, or indicative of a lack of status of designers in managerial hierarchies, 
which in turn may negatively affect the capacity to benefit from the contribution of design to 
product innovation17. Conversely, engaging in design-driven renewal means acknowledging internal 
and external designers as primary sources of ideas for new products. In firms engaged in design-
driven renewal, instead, design is not merely resorted to as a style-improvement strategy for mature 
products, but is considered a core capability and a primary source of competitive advantage. 
Although designers may be also requested to perform simple restyling or upgrade of existing 
products, they usually enjoy a high status inside the company and are generally recognize as 
important initiators and drivers of new product development.  
In most companies we observed, top managers signalled with symbolic and substantial 
actions the strategic relevance of design. Excellence in design was explicitly acknowledged in 
corporate statements and public speeches as a central element of the identity of the organization and 
a core attribute of the brand image18. In some cases, the elevation of chief designers at the rank of 
vice president gave design equal status to other functions in the corporate hierarchies (see table 3). 
Personal involvement of top managers in design-related activities signalled the rest of the 
organization that design was a strategic issue, worth the attention of the highest levels in the 
corporate hierarchy (see exhibit 1).  
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Exhibit 1: Bringing design back on top of corporate agenda at Apple 
Since its foundation, Apple Computers distinguished itself form other computer manufacturers for the innovativeness of 
the industrial design of its machines. Industrial designers at Apple pioneered new formal and functional solutions, such 
as the use of a plastic case, an icon-based operating system, and, later, an ergonomic keyboard and the frontal track 
ball on laptops. In the mid nineties, however, Apple products seemed to have lost originality. Sales were lagging and 
shares had plummeted. In 1997, the comeback of co-founder Steve Jobs brought design back at the centre of corporate 
agenda – as products like iMac and iBook visibly indicate – and played a fundamental part in the turnaround process. 
Steve Jobs has been described as the most design-savvy corporate leader in the computer industry. Aesthetic 
perfectionism and obsession for details led him to put emphasis on hardware design since the early days of the company. 
Back in 1983, he hired Frogdesign design consultants to fashion the unique concepts embodied in Apple computers into 
an equally distinctive appearance. In 1997, his return as head of the company marked a renewed focus on hardware 
engineering and design. His long discussions with chief designer Jonathan Ive and his frequent participation to team 
meetings signalled clearly how design was central again to corporate strategies. His return revived the enthusiasm of 
industrial designers and encouraged them once again to challenge the conventional wisdom of the computer industry.  
Jobs believed that no computer producers were serving the consumer segment well. Therefore, he focused Apple’s 
efforts to delivering innovative products, which addressed needs for ease of use, and the desire of more personal, 
expressive products. In early nineties the design centre explored several new concepts, few of which actually entered 
production. In 1996, Gil Amelio, who was briefly in charge before Steve Jobs re-entered the company, found around 
350 projects up and running. He slashed them down to 50. Later, Jobs personally reviewed the work of all products 
team and eventually reduced the number even further, concentrating the efforts of the industrial design group to no more 
than ten core projects, guided by the precise intent to eliminate overlaps, to simplify product lines and to address more 
forcefully its traditional target groups. Differences in design supported the positioning of different product families, 
making products more appealing to their own primary target segments: consumers for the colourful, fashionable iMac 
and iBook, and business for the sober G3 and PowerBook.   
 
Preserving the autonomy of designers and the integrity of ideas. In design centres and 
development units, a variety of projects are usually carried out at the same time. In the cases we 
analyzed, some projects followed inputs from marketers or explicit cues by top managers, who 
instructed designers according to corporate product or brand policies (see for instance exhibits 5 and 
6). Other projects, however, were initiated autonomously by the staff of the design centre, often 
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under the enlightened leadership of a chief designer. Products like the Oz refrigerator by Electrolux 
(see exhibit 7) or the popular Sony Walkman (see table 5), for instance, arose from spontaneous 
initiatives of designers and engineers, who received the support of top managers only when the core 
concepts had already been developed. Autonomous ideas usually departed from existing product 
categories, broke with established conventions and conceptions, stimulating an expansion or renewal 
of product lines.  
Exhibit 2. Stimulating and collecting new ideas at Alessi. 
At Alessi, some ideas for new products grow out of so-called “meta-projects” coordinated by Centro Studi Alessi 
(CSA). Set up in 1990, CSA coordinates work with young emerging designers and periodically organizes workshops 
with industrial designers and social scientists, in collaboration with architecture faculties and schools of arts and design. 
These workshops are often connected with broader “meta projects” like Memory Container (an exploration into the 
archetypes of food presentation) or Family Follows Fiction (an investigation of the emotional, playful structure of 
objects), purposefully aimed at inspiring periodic exploration of new product languages and renewal of product lines. 
Family Follows Fiction, for instance, explored a new style, based on brightly coloured plastic, anthropomorphic shapes, 
and allusive names, which eventually added a touch of irony, fun and emotional appeal to the Alessi brand. The 
colourful, ironic style of the plastic kitchenware designed by Guido Venturini and Stefano Giovannoni affected 
generations of products for a decade, and helped attract a broader audience of young consumers. 
Alessi routinely receives also spontaneous ideas – around 300 per year, at the time of our study – from 
independent designers who may, or may not, have worked for Alessi before. Co-General Manager Alberto Alessi 
considers designers as a “window on the world,” because they provide the company with a multiplicity of perspectives on 
how to interpret and address emerging lifestyles and societal trends. Designers’ intuition and sensitivity are considered 
more effective than traditional market research in capturing latent, unexpressed needs, and in shaping new product 
typologies. While most of them tend to develop concepts with little connection to existing styles or typologies, some of the 
latter, like Philippe Starck’s lemon squeezer or the whistling kettle by Richard Sapper, have led to some milestones in 
Alessi’s catalogue.  
Managers guiding design-driven renewal recognized the value of experimentation, and provided 
different arrangements to supply designers with the resources and the freedom required to engage in 
autonomous exploration of new forms and concepts, and ensure that the realization of their ideas is 
sheltered from arbitrary alterations due to commercial or productive reasons (see table 3). Sales 
managers are often uncomfortable with product design that substantially departs from what is 
already on the market, while production engineers tend to assign priority to cost reduction and 
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exploitation of current technologies, machinery, etc. The conservative, prudent attitude of sales 
managers and production engineers often clashes with, and sometimes stifles, designers’ bold, 
challenging proposals. 
Excessive reliance on inputs from market research or feasibility studies, for instance, may 
bring some companies to restrain the creative process or subject designers’ ideas to pre-mature 
alterations that essentially betray the concepts embodied in the original concepts. To some extent, 
interference from sales managers may be justified on commercial grounds, as small changes to 
original prototypes may be recommended in order to increase the saleability of new products. As 
some of our informants observed, however, excessive reliance on market research and current beliefs 
may stifle the creativity of designers and force their work within the straitjacket of conformity to 
existing product categories and features, and expressed customers’ wants19. Sheltering original 
concepts from pre-mature interference from other functions was considered crucial to preserve 
conceptual and stylistic integrity and avoid the dilution of the innovative potential of new ideas, due 
to conservative commercial or productive concerns (see table 3)20. 
Phase 2: Evaluation and selection of ideas 
While creativity is central to the first phase of the process, selection is the essence of the second: the 
allocation of funds and priority among the various ideas, concepts and prototypes proposed by 
designers. To some extent, the development of designers’ ideas is implicitly channelled by their own 
specific skills, attitudes and values, and by the corporate design policies that we have collectively 
termed design philosophy. However, as most of our informants observed, exploration and 
experimentation comes natural to designers, and it is indeed a critical requirement for effective 
design-driven renewal, as we have seen in the previous section.  
Yet, while experimentation is fundamental to frequent innovation, left to their own devices, 
designers may emphasize formal and conceptual research at the expense of market-oriented 
refinement and upgrading of existing product lines. Long-term growth requires instead a careful 
combination of both21. In fact, while research indicates that an excess of managerial control may 
stifle creativity and undermine the renewal of competitive advantage22, an excess of freedom may be 
equally deleterious. In some of the companies we observed, the gradual detachment of top managers 
from product policies and from the activity of the design centres was often associated with 
inefficient proliferation of projects or rubberstamping of designer’s ideas, with little concern for 
projected sales or development costs.  
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Effective design-driven renewal, instead, requires managers to counterbalance the creativity 
of designers by implementing a clear product policy, ensuring internal coherence among product 
design, core capabilities and brand policies, while at the same time adopting broad portfolio logic, 
evaluating each proposal in light of its potential contribution to the renewal process (table 4).  
---------------------------------- 
insert table 4 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
Implement a coherent product policy. The uncontrolled proliferation of development projects, 
many of which would never cross the boundaries of the design centres, may lead to a waste of time 
and resources, and turn designers’ attention away from the expansion and upgrading of existing 
product lines. This seems to have been the case, for instance, at Apple in the early nineties, when the 
top management gradually lost touch with the design centre resulting in a dispersion of attention and 
resources on hundreds of projects, many of which would never be put in production. Soon after its 
return at the head of the company, Steve Jobs dramatically reduced the number of projects, 
following a clear and consistent product policy. The development of non-core products like laser 
printers and palmtop computers was discontinued, and efforts were focused on new products that 
built on unique capabilities, such as hardware design and user interaction, and addressed the 
traditional target groups of the company: consumers, professionals and educators (see exhibit 1).  
What happened at Apple, however, is not uncommon in companies adopting design-based 
strategies. As design gradually becomes a fundamental element of differentiation and a source of 
competitive advantage, managers may be tempted to implicitly abdicate product policies, leaving 
them in the hands of designers, and turn their attention to corporate issues such as diversification, 
internationalisation, strategic alliances and finance. As their involvement in products – and often 
brands – gradually decreases, they may eventually give up control over design centres and, in fact, 
come to rubberstamp their proposals for new products. While not necessarily bad in itself, such loss 
of control may increase the risk of a divergence between designers and marketers and between the 
former and the market.  
This is what seems to have happened, for instance, at Bang & Olufsen in the mid eighties 
before the company entered one of the worst crises of its history. Newly appointed top managers 
dedicated to speeding up the international expansion of the company and the diversification in a 
number of related businesses. Inside the organization, focus on style, aesthetics, and technological 
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innovation gradually led to overlook efficiency concerns. Product development became a closed 
land, a place where top management was barred from any involvement. New product proposals were 
invariably accepted with little concern for their economic implications. It seemed that neither the 
development cost nor the commercial success of the products really mattered: winning design awards 
was implicitly considered more important than selling products. Accordingly, brand policies 
concentrated on luxury symbols to justify the increasing average price of products. In 1992, after 
sales decline had brought the company to face record losses, the eventual rejection of a proposal for 
a new product on grounds of lack of economic viability – something unheard of at Bang & Olufsen 
– sent a powerful signal that the new CEO Anders Knutsen seriously meant to take charge of 
product strategies again (see exhibit 7). 
While most companies recognise the selection phase as crucial, however, few have developed 
specific tools and procedures that try to combine an evaluation of the economic and commercial side 
of the project (expected costs and revenues, estimated sales, etc.) with a thorough assessment of new 
forms and concepts; the selection process is often described as based on intuition and gut feeling. 
While the evaluation of new concepts and forms may rely on tools like focus groups, semiotic 
analysis, and user observation, the final decision tends to be left to the judgement of managers, who 
may or may not possess the culture and the sensitivity required to appreciate truly innovative 
concepts. Alberto Alessi is a rare example of a manager who has attempted to codify principles to 
evaluate projects and to estimate their commercial potential (see exhibit 3). What worked for one 
company, however, may not work for others. In fact, Alessi’s recipe grew out of a personal reflection 
on what caused success and failure of around 300 products from the catalogue, and it is consistent 
with the positioning of the company as a high-end producer and design innovator, and with the core 
attributes of its brand: art, poetry, wonder and surprise. 
Exhibit 3. Evaluating and selecting new products at Alessi    
At Alessi, proposals for new products are routinely evaluated by a committee chaired by Alberto Alessi. In 1991, Mr. 
Alessi was pushed by his brothers Michele and Alessio to try to formalize his reasons for accepting or rejecting a 
product. Alberto Alessi carefully analyzed more than 300 projects assessed in the previous years, and he eventually 
identified four parameters that seemed to make a difference between extremely successful products, moderately successful 
ones, and total “fiascos”. These parameters now constitute the so-called “Success Formula”, a heuristic tool used to 
evaluate proposals for new products and to predict the reaction of Alessi’s customers.  
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Two parameters address core features of Alessi products. CL (Communication-Language) synthesizes the 
potential value of the product as a cultural communication tool – i.e. the extent to which consumers will be able to use 
the object as a “status symbol” or a “style symbol”. The second parameter, SMI (Sense-Memory-Imagination), instead 
relates to the emotional response aroused by the multi-sensual experience provided to the user, as triggered by an 
intimate connection with individual memory and collective imagery. Most of the 300 products, however, scored high on 
both parameters. Two more variables had to be included, in order to discriminate between different outcomes: price and 
function. A reasonable price and a good functionality, compared to alternative products within the same typology, in 
fact, generally seemed to be required to expand sales from few affluent design-lovers to broader segments of the market. 
Rating criteria were defined for each parameter, and each object was rated according to the four parameters. The total 
score was found to be a fairly good predictor of sales volume.  
Under the direction of Alberto Alessi, the “Success Formula” is used by the small committee that evaluates 
incoming ideas. After a preliminary assessment of technical feasibility, the committee rates each proposal on the four 
parameters. CL and SMI are crucial: proposals that score less than three points on these two items are immediately 
rejected. Most Alessi products score between 12 and 18, the latter meaning expected sales around 100,000 units. 
Some products, however, may be put in production even if they score poorly on price or functionality.  
 
Adopt portfolio logic. While each product is assessed separately, Alessi, like other companies we 
observed, follows what we could call portfolio logic whereby some projects may be undertaken 
regardless of their expected cash flow. In other words, management does not insist on all products 
becoming commercial blockbusters, but recognises the importance of preserving and upgrading the 
intangible capital on which long-term success rests.  
A few companies in our sample periodically developed so-called “image-builders” or 
“flagship” products in order to reap design awards, attract the attention of the press, support 
communication strategies and reinforce brand image, even if sales managers did not expect them to 
produce high volumes or margins (see exhibit 7 for an example). In some cases, following a logic 
that resembles that of fashion collections23, “image-builders” were used to explore bold new 
elements of style, which will be replicated, although in a less radical form, in more commercial lines. 
In fact, so-called “design factories” such as Alessi, Artemide, and Kartell maintain large, apparently 
inefficient portfolios where redundancy of lines and concepts is aimed at reinforcing the external 
perception of central elements of style or core values of the brand, regardless of commercial or 
economic concerns.  
16 
Other projects were pursued regardless of market expectations, in order to explore new 
technologies or build market knowledge (see exhibit 4). These projects usually departed from existing 
principles or product lines, and introduced discontinuities in style, technologies, functionality, etc. As 
such, their commercial contribution was hard to assess or expected to be marginal. Nevertheless, 
these “experimental products” – some of which would never really be commercialized on a large 
scale – were used to test and develop new ways of interpreting customers’ needs and preferences and 
applications of technology, occasionally stimulating broader changes at strategic and organizational 
level.  
Exhibit 4. Design for corporate renewal at Alessi: the Tea & Coffee Piazza project 
Completed in 1983, Tea & Coffee Piazza marked a turning point in the strategy and in the identity of the company. 
The project – a collection of tea and coffee services designed by leading architects and industrial designers – was 
conceived as “sophisticated design experimentation”, aimed at exploring new forms and product typologies. None of 
these products was really expected to encounter commercial success. In fact, only one designer, Oscar Tusquet, really 
concerned himself with the industrial implications of large scale production  
However, while commercial results were marginal – development costs were high and each object was produced 
only in 99 pieces – Tea & Coffee Piazza is credited for stimulating profound cultural changes in the company, with 
visible impact on product and brand strategies in the following decades. Tea & Coffee Piazza triggered a reflection on 
the utility of small scale productions, leading to a new high-quality section of the catalogue named Officina Alessi 
(Alessi Workshop), dedicated to experimental, limited scale productions. Furthermore, the project enabled Alessi to 
establish relationships with designers like Aldo Rossi and Michael Graves, who will later design some of the most 
representative products of the eighties.  
More generally, however, the project stimulated a reassessment of the competitive scope of the company. It 
opened up the company to the collaboration with external suppliers for the manufacturing of non-steel objects, laying the 
foundation for future diversification in ceramics (100% Make-up project), wood (Twergy) and, most of all, plastics. 
Even in steel technologies, Tea & Coffee Piazza encouraged experimentation in new productive and decorative 
solutions that characterised later, more commercial products. In fact, according to Alberto Alessi, the project started off 
the trend of highly expressive products which have become a distinctive feature of Alessi’s catalogue, and facilitated re-
positioning as a widely recognized design leader in the kitchenware industry. 
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Phase 3: Revision of design principles 
Organizational learning and development are intrinsic to strategic renewal24. Strategic renewal implies 
the willingness to question and occasionally revise the set of goals, values and principles that 
underpin organizational strategies25. As societal values and demography evolve, new lifestyles and 
patterns of use emerge. New technologies and intense competition tend to continually increase the 
available opportunities of production and consumption. Even successful companies ought to 
periodically reflect on, revise, or at least re-interpret their philosophy, in order to stay in tune with 
cultural changes and technological development. 
In design-driven renewal processes, organizational development tends to be associated to a 
revision of design policies stimulated by intense positive or negative environmental feedback on 
experimental products. Negative feedback – sales decline, unenthusiastic response etc. – may raise 
concerns about the soundness of current principles and aesthetic canons. Conversely, positive 
feedback – unexpected market success, general acclaim etc. – may reinforce designers’ beliefs in an 
emerging design philosophy.  
In our observations, however, widely acclaimed new features were rarely serendipitous: more 
often, renewal was initiated by experimental products like the Philips-Alessi line described in the 
introduction, the colourful Nokia 2110 mobile phone (see exhibit 5) or the self-adjusting Oticon 
MultiFocus hearing aid (see exhibit 6), which intentionally departed from dominant philosophies, 
and challenged consolidated “industrial recipes”. Their success facilitated a broad reassessment of the 
validity of current strategies and promoted a re-orientation, which often resulted in adjustments to 
the strategic intent. In other cases, a conscious reflection on the validity of current design principles 
was initiated in order to support and shape emerging strategies (see, for instance, exhibits 1 and 7). In 
both cases, design philosophy and strategic intent seemed to co-evolve, as designers and managers 
collaborated to shape a new strategic course.  
In the cases we observed, while experimentation was usually carried out autonomously by 
designers in an idea generation phase, managers could promote organizational development by 
stimulating periodic reflection on the validity of current principles, and maintain alertness to the 
environmental feedback. 
---------------------------------- 
insert table 5 about here 
---------------------------------- 
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Maintain alertness to environmental feedback.  
Organizations generally display a lack of willingness to question established routines and shared 
beliefs. Perceptual and organizational philtres tend to select environmental feedback that confirms 
prevailing interpretations of consumers’ preferences or the possibilities of technology, and to ignore 
signals that may question the appropriateness of current practices and principles. Timely and 
effective renewal, instead, requires alertness to events that may challenge currently held beliefs of 
managers and designers about the appropriate way to design new products (see exhibit 5). These 
events include both decline in market appeal of current product lines and unexpected success of 
experimental products. 
Experimental products are usually aimed at exploring market response to new formal or 
functional features. Sometimes, variations are the result of new entries in design centres, and reflect 
their personal view on societal trends, user needs, etc. Yet, variations may also be prompted by 
marketing managers and purposefully address what are perceived to be gaps in the market and unmet 
customers’ preferences. The magnitude of these “niches”, however, is rarely known in advance: sales 
forecasts rarely offer precise estimates of the market for revolutionary products. While variations 
may reflect emerging or tentative interpretations on the designers’ and mangers’ side, it is only when 
experimental products are finally put on the market that the validity of the former can be assessed.  
In this respect, the unexpected success, or lack thereof, of new products may indicate a 
discrepancy in designers and managers’ interpretations and expectations, on one side, and customer 
preferences on the other. In these cases, careful monitoring and analysis of the results of these 
products might help managers refine their understandings of market segmentation and catch early 
signals of changing customer preferences.  
Exhibit 5. Nokia: Designing mobile phones for emerging lifestyles 
The success of Nokia in the mobile phone industry is partly linked to the somewhat chance discovery of a wide segment 
of the market governed by fashion-like dynamics, which in 1994 pushed sales of model 2100 to volumes 50 times 
bigger than expected. Nokia’s casual discovery of an unsatisfied desire for expression and personalization eventually led 
managers to revise product policies, and gave the company a first-mover advantage in designing and marketing products 
addressing individual needs and lifestyles. 
Nokia 2110 is considered a breakthrough in the design of mobile phones. Details like the rounded keypads 
and the elliptical shape were due to future chief designer Frank Nuovo’s will to enhance the perceived friendliness and 
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the emotional appeal of the product. However, the idea of releasing the model in five different colours was not 
purposefully aimed at exploiting an untapped segment of the market. Yet the unexpected success revealed to Nokia’s 
marketers and product developers the changing nature of mobile phones from mere communication devices to personal 
accessories, and cast doubts about currently held beliefs about customers’ preferences.  
Market research eventually led managers at Nokia to identify four basic profiles of customers leading the 
adoption of the new technology – each characterised by a different lifestyle: trendsetters always at the leading edge of 
technology, style-conscious posers, high-flyers belonging to the business segment, and social contact seekers, who tried to 
combine reliability, affordability and personal expression. Since then, the segmentation model has been frequently 
updated, following global consumer studies. Later, for instance, further research brought the number of profiles to six – 
experiences, impressors, controllers, maintainers, balancers and sharers – each characterized by a different relationship 
with the object and by specific preferences about style and functionality. Industrial design practices have been changed 
accordingly in order to be responsive to evolving lifestyles and to tailor the style, features and attributes of each product to 
precise customers’ profiles.  
Also, the new philosophy, emphasizing principles such as personalization, simplicity and style, acknowledged 
changes occurring in mobile phones, which had become, in Frank Nuovo’s own words a combination of “personal 
accessories”, “total communication tools”, and “entertainment products”. Lifestyle segmentation provided designers with 
a broad framework for the development of new concepts, features, visual appearances and user interfaces tailored to the 
needs and lifestyles of specific target groups. Increasing preferences for personalized products initially revealed by the 
success of the 2110 were addressed in different ways, from the introduction of changeable shells to the establishment of a 
subsidiary, Nokia Vertu, hand-crafting custom made luxury phones for wealthy customers. Particular emphasis was 
also placed on enhancing user experience by the careful selection of materials, and by the development of friendly, easy-to-
use interfaces. Increased attention to trends in fashion, architecture, and other forms of culture reflected the will to keep 
the company’s products always abreast of societal trends, and resonated  CEO Jorma Ollila statement that the new 
strategic intent would be centred on a relentless search for global leadership in mobile telecommunication. 
 
Stimulate reflection on the validity of current beliefs. At times, designers may autonomously 
engage in formal rethinking of design principles or dominant stylistic traits. Such was, for instance, 
the cases of the Spirit project at the Sony Design Centre mentioned in table 3, or the new High 
Design philosophy promoted by Stefano Marzano at Philips (see table 6). Top managers, however, 
may also encourage re-consideration of current beliefs about appropriate ways of designing products, 
urging designers to reflect on indications emerging from sales trends, market surveys, and other 
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forms of environmental feedback (see table 5). These signals rarely lead designers and managers to 
reject the current philosophy in toto. Nonetheless they may induce companies to revise outdated 
styles, adapting them to new tastes, to re-interpret core principles, temporarily downplaying 
unwanted features, or even to build on fortunate stylistic or technological innovations.  
In some companies we observed, top managers facing corporate decline and loss of market 
appeal even urged designers and product developers to collaborate in shaping a new strategic course. 
A conscious revision of the principles guiding product design, then, reflected and in part inspired a 
parallel redefinition of strategic intent. Experimental products embodying new formal and functional 
traits were used to test and refine a new strategic course (see exhibit 6).  
Exhibit 6. Challenging engineering culture at Oticon  
Located in Denmark, Oticon is a leading producer of hearing aids. During the 1990s, Oticon has been widely 
celebrated for the revolutionary project-based design of its organizational structures and systems – the so-called 
“spaghetti organization”. Much less attention has been dedicated to its innovations in the design of hearing aids from 
the functional (automatic adjustment of amplification intensity, digital amplification, etc.) and formal standpoint (satin 
textures, lean shapes, original colours, translucent plastic, etc.), testified by industrial design awards. 
For decades, Oticon had dominated the market for behind-the-ear hearing aids. During the eighties, the 
success of smaller in-the-ear models – technologically inferior, but cosmetically more appealing – had eroded sales 
volumes and market shares. Nevertheless, product developers at Oticon refused to acknowledge changes taking place in 
the market, and persisted in the design and development of technically advanced, but cumbersome devices. In 1988, the 
new CEO Lars Kolind assembled a project team to rapidly develop and market a self-adjusting prototype code-named 
E36, encouraging members to adopt a fresh look at issues of product design and development.  
What was later marketed as MultiFocus carried the seeds of a new set of principles regarding the aesthetics of 
hearing-aids, design goals, and user-machine interaction which would later affect generations of product throughout the 
nineties. The need to accommodate a cumbersome mechanism, for instance, led team members to revise the design of the 
device. Shapes were redesigned in a more appealing form. The colour was changed from the traditional flesh pink to 
opaque titanium. The new design was meant to change the perception of the product, so that it would be associated 
mentally with high-tech electronic items, rather than medical prostheses, thus lightening the “psychological burden” on 
the user. New packaging was designed for easy use and safe transportation. A notebook called “The Oticon Diary” 
was included in the package, so that first-time users could use it to record observations and listening experiences. 
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As a member of the team later remarked, MultiFocus became a means to stimulate changes in entrenched 
beliefs in the organization. Product developers were encouraged to rethink their approach, expanding their focus from 
pure technical performance of its products to the user’s quality of life, in the widest sense. “Instead of thinking of 
ourselves as a manufacturer who has to serve his customers, we need to see ourselves as a service company offering a 
concrete product.” – Kolind declared – Oticon has to stop regarding itself as a ‘producer of acoustic equipment’: our real 
mission is to help people with hearing problems live the life they wish.” The commercial success of MultiFocus went 
beyond expectations and reinforced Kolind’s confidence in his emerging strategy. 
Shifting attention towards users’ quality of life sensitized designers to the psychological aspects involved in using 
hearing aids, traditionally regarded as signs of handicap and therefore sources of unease for the wearer. After the success 
of MultiFocus, the new PerSonic line was released in a whole series of “hair tone colours”, meant to help the device 
blend with the facial features of the user. Later, the OtiKids line introduced leaner shapes, translucent plastic and 
bright colours in order to help children accept their own handicap with less severity, by designing more pleasing and 
socially acceptable devices.  
The new strategic intent, however, re-oriented the process of new product development even beyond design issues 
in a strict sense. In the past, product developers placed emphasis on technical aspects linked to the improvement in 
clarity of sound reproduction and intensity of amplification. Since early '90s, psycho-acoustic research, carried out 
directly with patients and aimed at identifying the various ways in which hearing problems are perceived depending on 
age, work, and lifestyle, has become pre-eminent. MultiFocus pioneered the development of revolutionary products such 
as DigiFocus and DigiLife, guided by the ambition of offering products capable of flexibly adapting sound processing to 
changes in users’ needs and lifestyles. The logic behind the Oticon diary was later developed in what was termed the 
Human Link philosophy, supporting the transfer of information from patients to audiologists to improve the fitting and 
fine tuning of products.  
Phase 4: Diffuse new design principles 
In order for the renewal process to fully display its effects, organizational development must cross 
the boundaries of design centres and top management teams: changes in beliefs and attitudes about 
design principles and strategic positioning should affect the whole organization. In well-crafted 
design-based strategies, designers, brand managers, and advertisers cooperate to develop and sustain 
brand policies that are faithful to and enhance the distinctive features of products. Like advertisers, 
product designers contribute to attach meaning to products and names through the use of signs and 
language, and therefore to create and sustain distinctive brands26. Both advertising and product 
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design accomplish a process of “representation,” through which meaning is constructed and attached 
to products and brand names, by imbuing a set of technologies with particular cultural meaning27.  
As some of our informants observed, therefore, it is important that all the actors that impact 
on how products are produced, packaged, advertised, distributed, sold and serviced are aware of the 
philosophy that underlies product design and emphasize, rather than blur or downplay, distinctive 
formal or functional features. Ensuring that the new design philosophy propagates throughout the 
organisation and even across its boundaries, then, seems to be a critical managerial task (see table 6).  
---------------------------------- 
insert table 6 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
Encourage the codification of core design principles. Strictly speaking, a design philosophy 
needs not to be made explicit in order to influence designers’ work. Sometimes changes in the 
principles guiding designers are simply embedded in new working practices and incorporated in the 
design of new product lines28. Coordination with marketers, advertisers, distributors and salespeople, 
however, is usually required in order to emphasize new features properly. As long as the awareness 
of a design philosophy hardly crosses the boundaries of design centres, marketing programs may 
overlook distinctive features of products, the potential benefits of which – be they functional or 
expressive – are not fully emphasized in market communication and sales behaviour. In this respect, 
written statements about the essential principles of design that underlie a company’s product may 
increase the consistency between how products are designed, how brands are defined and the 
content of advertising campaigns.  
In most of the companies we studied, design philosophy was at some point in time made 
explicit and summarised in formal statements, short documents or corporate speeches, which were 
meant to become a reference point for designers, helping the former relate their practices and 
principles to the work of strategists and marketers, and facilitating the coordination between them 
and the rest of the company (see exhibit 7). 
 
Exhibit 7. Restating corporate values at Bang & Olufsen 
For decades, Bang & Olufsen, a Danish producer of high-end audio-video systems, has pioneered innovation in style 
and technology in consumer electronics. In 1974, Bang & Olufsen's unique design philosophy was codified in what 
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came to be known as the Seven Corporate Identity Components – core design principles guiding design and 
communication policies (see table 7). At that time, the mandate of the working group that codified the Seven CIC was 
not to lay a new foundation for design and communication strategies, but simply to interpret “existing, but unexpressed 
attitudes,” in order to facilitate coordination among designers, advertisers and dealers, and to provide a stable reference 
point for product development as well as market communication and sales.  
---------------------------------- 
insert table 7 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
In the mid eighties, however, designers gradually lost touch with consumers’ values and needs. Product development 
emphasized an aspect, integration of audio and video sources, which was less and less valued by consumers. 
Communication, instead, de-emphasized the essential qualities of the products, and concentrated on luxury symbols to 
justify their increasing average price. Eventually Bang & Olufsen came to be perceived as an expensive luxury brand. 
With the collapse of the yuppie culture and the sudden economic decline in the late 1980s, however, the potential 
market for these products contracted, resulting in a sudden decline in sales volume.  
In 1991, with a view to meeting bigger potential demand and increase sales volumes, the newly appointed 
CEO Anders Knutsen decided to extend the lower end of the product range. Marketing simpler and less expensive 
products under the same name, however, might have blurred the image of the company and its products. The new models 
should have shared the same basic elements and distinctive features of Bang & Olufsen products; the same consistency 
had to be kept in corporate communication. A formal assessment of the validity of the existing design philosophy and 
brand identity was perceived as crucial in coordinating attempts to expand the customer base and fuel sales growth, 
without harming the exclusive corporate image.  
An international field survey indicated that Bang & Olufsen was widely regarded as a company that creates 
harmony between aesthetics and technology. Respondents ranked the immediate perception of technological excellence 
(reliability, high performance, advanced research, etc.) as the number one feature. Then, respondents indicated the 
emotional side of the product, as reflected in the design, in the choice of material components, and in the mechanical 
movements. All the other features were ranked lower. Meanwhile, a project team was assigned the task of reflecting 
upon and precisely defining the “brand essence” of the company. After several informal meetings, the group came out 
with what would have later be called the New Vision, the formula used to convey the new strategic intent and the 
essence of the brand: “The best of both worlds: Bang & Olufsen, the unique combination of technological excellence and 
emotional appeal.” The words chosen to express the company’s vision summed up what really distinguished Bang & 
Olufsen products and brand from competitors, stimulating designers and advertises to contribute to reinforce the very 
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basis of the competitive advantage of the company. Development efforts were re-focused around the capabilities that 
underpinned the core attributes of the brand: mechanical movements, integration of sound and image, system-human 
interface, choice of materials, and design. Communication campaigns brought products back to centre stage, emphasizing 
once again key aspects of the underlying philosophy like individuality, domesticity, and essentiality. 
 
Promote awareness of design philosophy among peripheral actors. Advertisers and brand 
managers are not the only actors influencing the commercial success of innovative products. In our 
research we came across cases where lack of clarity about the core features of products and their 
relevance for brand policies, led to inconsistent sales behaviour, which misdirected potential 
customers and undermined the commercial potential of new products. In some cases, specific 
programs and initiatives were undertaken to educate distributors and retailers, and ensure consistent 
presentation, sales policies and service. At Bang & Olufsen for instance, in the early nineties, market 
tests showed that products were sold mainly as luxury goods, as salespeople emphasized only the 
aesthetic side, overlooking technological excellence and the original conceptual solutions. In 1996, 
marketing managers responded with a massive training program, called Match Point, aimed at raising 
awareness of the philosophy behind the products throughout the network of dealers, making sure 
that they shared and conveyed to potential customers the same values and principles that inspired the 
work of designers (see table 6). While written statements, training programs and other formal 
communication tools may disseminate analytic information about the core elements of a design 
philosophy, some companies we observed explicitly used products themselves as carriers of 
information about emerging philosophies to a broad audience.  
Exhibit 8. Product design and brand repositioning at Electrolux 
The Electrolux Group is a world leader in the production of household appliances, a position built through the 
acquisition of companies such as White Consolidated, Zanussi and AEG. In mid-nineties, Electrolux carried out a 
re-organisation of brands and product lines following the “design families” concept, based on consumers’ different life 
styles. The plan brought to the identification of a clear target for each of the three main brands of the group: Electrolux, 
AEG and Zanussi. In the intention of brand managers, Zanussi targeted dynamic, style-conscious customers, who 
welcomed new ideas and solutions matching their needs and problems, and expressed their personality through their 
environment. “Zanussi” – read the brand essence statement – “delivers innovative solutions in a distinctive and leading 
design” 
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Market research, however, revealed that the positioning of the Zanussi brand varied considerably around 
Europe. Compared to other core brands of the group, Zanussi enjoyed lower brand awareness, but most of all had a 
blurred image and a heterogeneous positioning on various domestic markets. In the United Kingdom, for instance, it 
was known as the leading product as for style and functionality; in Germany, instead, it was considered as medium-
quality producer. In a few small European countries the Zanussi brand was little known at all, and in Italy it was 
only associated to built-in household appliances, as all stand-alone products were sold under the Rex brand. In the 
words of one of Zanussi brand managers, they “had to strive to explain both consumers and retailers the real emotional 
and functional benefits of Zanussi products.” The revolutionary design of a new high-end refrigerator, the Oz model, 
played an important role in promoting a region-wide repositioning of Zanussi and in tightening up the division around 
the new brand identity. 
The ice-blue, rounded, egg-shape of Oz pioneered so-called bio-design in large home appliances. Oz result from 
autonomous reflections on the changing relationships between man and machine, carried out at the Zanussi industrial 
design centre under the leadership of chief designer Roberto Pezzetta. In an early stage of development, sales managers 
pressed Mr. Pezzetta to substantially alter the design of the product, by straightening lines and reverting to white. The 
prototype was perceived as departing excessively from the design of the vast majority of large appliances, and serious 
concerns were raised about the saleability of the product. Eventually, however, brand managers perceived Oz as an 
important step in refocusing the positioning of the Zanussi brand. Semiotic analysis indicated that the principles of bio-
design that characterised Oz strongly underlined “conviviality at the expense of functionality, the natural as opposed to 
the artificial, passion as opposed to reason”, and helped convey an image of Zanussi as a company “capable of 
producing not just ordinary objects but something extraordinary as well.”  
The product became a powerful communication tool. Although production was discontinued after the first 
batch of 5000 items, Oz quickly became a corporate icon, and appeared on several corporate communication devices – 
annual reports, catalogues, web sites, etc. – long after that. The revolutionary fridge won Zanussi widespread recognition 
from the specialized and the popular press, and reaped several design awards. Inside the company, however, Oz is 
credited for having communicated effectively the new brand identity to marketers and engineers, distributors and 
customers, helping reposition Zanussi around Europe in a consistent way.  
Discussion 
The design-driven process we have described in this article presents continuous innovation and 
corporate transformation as the outcome of different stages of a broader renewal process acting at 
two levels. At a product level, autonomous or induced projects taking place in design centres or 
carried out by freelance external designers stimulate continuous renewal of product lines, inspired by 
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a common set of principles and stylistic guidelines. Innovation at this level may gradually push an 
expansion in the competitive scope of the company or adjustments in its competitive strategies (see, 
for instance, exhibits 4 and 8). Occasionally, however, the success of experimental products or lines 
carrying innovative formal or functional features may encourage substantial revisions in the 
philosophy guiding product design, and stimulate broader corporate renewal (see, for instance, 
exhibits 1, 6 and 7). At an organizational level, then, changes in the design philosophy may co-evolve 
with a re-orientation of the strategic course of the company.  
Design management scholars have rarely attempted to connect design activities to the 
process of strategy formation29. Past literature has generally focused on how careful management of 
design activities can improve performance, quality, look and cost of the product – and therefore 
customer satisfaction30. Our research, however, indicates that interpreting product design only as a 
way to differentiate the offerings of a company in light of factors such as aesthetics, price and 
performance, may emphasise only the superficial outcome of the design process, overlooking its 
potential in driving or facilitating strategic renewal. Explicit reflection on distinctive core elements of 
the philosophy underlying product design and on their connections with technological competencies 
and brand values may help managers shape or support a coherent strategic intent to regain or 
reinforce competitive advantage. While using design – or rather “styling” – as a way to stimulate 
stagnant demand or sustain exports is not new to companies, promoting design-driven renewal 
means recognizing that design is not simply a matter of enhancing functionality or styling, but is a 
powerful symbolic medium for expressing or reinforcing a unique set of meanings embodied in a 
brand. Design may then support the new strategic course by performing an integrative role between 
technology and meaning, as form and function of new products inspired by the design philosophy of 
the company draw on core capabilities to sustain public perception of the brand (see figure 1). 
The relationships between strategy, design philosophy, core capabilities and brand image, 
however, do not seem to be univocal and unidirectional. In cases like Bang & Olufsen or Apple, a 
clearer strategic intent emerged from a reflection on the distinctive capabilities of the company and 
the core attributes of its brand, mediated by the essential elements of the design philosophy and 
reflected in unique features of the products. Renewal in product development reflected broader 
corporate changes. The success of new products consolidated the trend and promoted further 
organizational development. At Oticon, Kartell and Nokia, the success of experimental products 
embodying the seed of a new design philosophy set in motion a process of renewal that reinforced 
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confidence in an emerging strategy and encouraged product designers to explore new ways of 
leveraging on existing capabilities. In other cases, such as Alessi and Swatch, frequent renewal of 
product lines was essential to preserve a reputation as design leader in their respective markets. Their 
design philosophies evolved gradually and almost unintentionally, stimulated by continuous 
exploration of new formal and conceptual solutions. At times, however, projects like Tea & Coffee 
Piazza or Family Follows Fiction stimulated broader development in strategy, positioning and 
culture.  
---------------------------------- 
insert figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
In practical terms, our research indicates the importance that the design philosophy of a company 
co-evolves with the company's competitive scope, its broad mission, and its fundamental strategic 
goals – in other words, with its strategic intent. In this respect, an explicit strategic intent – 
synthesised in a more or less elaborate corporate statement – may help designers relate their work to 
broader issues of competition, market positioning and long-term prosperity of the company, 
providing them with meaningful strategic direction. Consistency between strategic intent and design 
philosophy may empower the latter as a framework for design and marketing activities, and embed 
the former in the core intangible assets of the company – its technological capabilities and its brand 
image.  
Practical implications of our study touch also the role of managers in guiding the design 
process and coordinating its interaction with other functions. While our model acknowledges the 
primacy of designers in generating or at least developing new ideas that may spark off strategic 
renewal, nonetheless we believe that managers play a critical role in steering the process as they 
should legitimate and preserve the leading role of designers in early stages of product development, 
implement consistent product policies through careful selection of projects, promote reflection on 
and revision of design philosophy in light of external feedback, and finally spread awareness of the 
design philosophy throughout the organisation to ensure consistent brand policies and sales 
behaviour. As we have seen in the previous sections, abdicating this crucial role may underexploit the 
creative potential of designers, or end up in dispersion of efforts and lack of coordination between 
design, marketing and sales. 
---------------------------------- 
insert table 8 about here 
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In fact, engaging in design-driven renewal it is not free from dangers. Some common pitfalls 
have been discussed in the previous sections and are summarized in table 8. While an 
underestimation of the potential impact of designers on product and organizational renewal (phases 
1 and 3) may lead to stagnation and decline, even committing to design-driven renewal has some 
risks. In some of the cases we analyzed, for instance, designers acquired so much influence that they 
could virtually dictate development policies, as managers did not dare – or bother – to interfere with 
their experimentation or to reject their proposals. As a result, an inordinate amount of resources was 
invested in development activities that often led to products with little commercial viability. Effective 
design-driven renewal requires instead a careful management of the process, in order to strike a 
balance between creativity and management. While, to some extent, designers should be sheltered 
from excessive pressures and constraints from other functions, total lack of control on the 
managerial side does not seem to be healthy either. 
Also, unity of intent and consistency of action between design and branding is critical to 
support effective design-based strategies. Sometimes, however, the connection between designers 
and marketers may loosen up. On one side, design centres may become affected by a self-referential 
syndrome, as designers get caught in the exploration of concepts, styles or technologies that are too 
advanced for their time, have little market application or little concern for production costs. On the 
other side, brand managers and advertisers may develop brand-building campaigns that try to appeal 
to the market, without emphasising or really being supported by the actual characteristics of the 
products. In this respect, organizational development activities may also contribute to periodically 
tighten up the various parts of the organization around core design principles and brand values 
supporting the positioning of the company and its brands.  
Conclusions 
The evolution of competitive dynamics in a growing number of industries has led, or in some cases 
brought back, managers’ attention to the design process. Strategic management of design activities 
seems to have become a powerful source of competitive advantage even in high-technology 
industries, usually dominated by issues of price, performance, and technological standards. The 
companies mentioned in this article are but the most conspicuous examples of how careful 
management of the design process can support strategic renewal even in consumer industries which 
are apparently mature or with consolidated positions. Although they differ in industry, size, scope of 
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operation, and configuration of activities, they are similar in the way they use or have used design to 
support continuous renewal of product lines and periodic reorientation of competitive strategies. 
While the coordination of external designers or internal design centres with other organizational 
units may pose specific challenges to design managers, our research suggests the existence of 
commonalties in the interaction between designers and managers along new product development, 
and in the way design can affect strategy formation. Building on evidence from our study, we have 
proposed an interpretive framework, highlighting critical issues to be addressed and potential sources 
of inefficiency, and providing indications for managers engaged in guiding design-driven renewal.  
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Table 1. Design-driven renewal: some illustrative cases  
Artemide (lighting) 
In 1995, the perceived threat of commoditization of designers’ lamps pushed 
CEO Ernesto Gismondi to explore new design approaches using light as a 
“construction material” to produce effects of high emotional impact. The 
Human Light project became a platform for revising brand values and 
rethinking distribution strategies (see tables 5 and 6). 
 
Alessi (houseware) 
Under the leadership of Alberto Alessi, tighter collaboration with renowned 
architects and designers has gradually pushed the company to expand its 
product lines beyond the boundaries of steel kitchenware, and sustained brand 
repositioning and relentless search for new stylistic and conceptual solutions 
(see exhibit 4). 
 
Apple (personal computers) 
Since its foundation, the company has pioneered aesthetic and conceptual 
innovation in the personal computer industry. In 1997, renewed attention to 
product design – as witnessed by products like iMac and iBook –was central to 
the turnaround strategy orchestrated by returning founder Steve Jobs (see 
exhibit 1). 
 
Bang & Olufsen (consumer electronics) 
For decades, a unique design philosophy has differentiated Bang & Olufsen 
from its larger competitors. In early nineties, a revision of design principles and 
policies supported refocus of brand identity and expansion of the product 
range (see exhibit 7). 
 
Electrolux, Zanussi division (home appliances) 
The Zanussi Industrial Design Center routinely explores new product 
concepts, driving periodic renewal in existing product lines. In late nineties, 
highly innovative products such as Oz refrigerator and Jetsy washing machines 
have been used to support brand policies and re-positioning at a regional level 
(see exhibit 8). 
 
Kartell (furniture) 
For three decades, Kartell has pioneered technological innovation in plastic furniture. During 
the eighties, the company declined due to lack of inspiration and the decreasing appeal of 
plastic. In early nineties, the collaboration with creative emerging designers stimulated the 
refinement of core capabilities in plastic technologies and supported renewal of product lines 
and revamping of brand image (see appendix B) 
 
Nokia (mobile phones) 
The serendipitous discovery of a large segment of style-conscious users in the market for 
mobile phones, and the subsequent revision of design and marketing policies contributed to the 
outstanding growth of the company in mid nineties and to its rising as one of the most valuable 
global brands (see exhibit 5). 
 
Oticon (hearing aids) 
Radical organizational changes in early nineties were followed by revolutionary approaches to 
product design, reflecting a new philosophy centred on improving quality of life of hearing 
impaired people (see exhibit 6) 
 
Philips (consumer products) 
Under the leadership of Francesco Marzano, the design centre has explored creative 
applications of advanced technologies to consumers’ latent needs and desires. The work of 
Philips Design has encouraged rethinking of the connections between design and strategy 
formation, and inspired renewal in areas such as domestic appliances, personal care, and 
medical devices (see introduction and table 6). 
 
Sony (consumer electronics) 
The Sony Design Centre has historically pioneered innovation in consumer electronics, 
stimulating diversification and renewal of product lines based on creative applications of new 
technologies and development of entirely new product concepts (see Appendix B). 
 
Swatch (wristwatches) 
Early Swatch watches combined inexpensive reliable technology with an appealing style, and 
introduced fashion dynamics in the market for wristwatches. Frequent innovation in style and 
shapes was due to an unusual mix of industrial designers and artists, and sustained brand 
positioning as a market leader and innovator. 
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Table 2. Design-driven strategic renewal: the main phases  
 Phases Description 
 
 
 
Product development 
phases 
 
 
Generation of ideas  
 
Designers periodically submit ideas for new products.  
Some ideas follow established design principles, build on existing capabilities, and conform 
to current style.  
Others introduce innovation in formal and functional features, departing from the current 
design philosophy. 
 
Evaluation and 
selection of ideas 
Some ideas are discarded for lack of feasibility or fit with corporate features.  
Others are selected and receive funds for further development, exploring new technologies, 
concepts and styles. 
 
 
 
Organizational 
development phases 
Revision of the 
design philosophy 
External feedback on products leads to question established beliefs about market 
segmentation, user needs and lifestyles, cultural values, etc.  
Design philosophy is updated following indications from the environment. 
 
Diffusion of new 
ideas 
Awareness of core elements of the design philosophy is promoted throughout the 
organisation and across its boundaries.  
Substantial and symbolic actions are meant to ensure consistency of marketing efforts, and 
orient generation of new ideas. 
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 Table 3. Phase one: Generation of ideas 
The role of managers Examples 
Establish the strategic 
relevance of design with 
substantial and symbolic 
action.  
 At Apple Computers, after the return of founder Steve Jobs, design has recovered centrality in the corporate agenda. The 
industrial design centre has regained enthusiasm and inspiration, leading to commercial blockbusters such as iMac, iBook, 
and iPod (see exhibit1).  At Sony, proposals for new products often originate from the Sony Design Centre. Quarterly, new concepts and product 
ideas are presented to managers from the rest of the group. From founders Akio Morita and Masaru Ibuka to current 
CEO Nobuyuki Idei, top managers are used to visiting the Centre periodically and to sharing their observations with 
designers. Mr. Idei himself has directed the Centre between 1990 and 1993.   At Kartell, Artemide, Alessi and other so-called “design factories”, top managers personally acted as design managers, by 
contacting, selecting, hiring and interacting with renowned freelance designers, and often supervising the development 
process of major projects.  At Nokia, the relevance of design for the corporate strategies was emphasized by the appointment of chief designers 
Frank Nuovo as Vice President for Design. At the time of our study, Jonathan Ive, director of the Apple Industrial Design 
Group, held a similar position in the corporate hierarchy.  
 
Encourage and shelter the 
autonomous development of 
designers’ ideas. 
 
 In the Electrolux group, while much designers’ work involves incremental adjustments to existing product lines, directors 
of local design centres in Nurnberg and Pordenone enjoy considerable freedom to explore new forms and product 
concepts. Bold stylistic or technological solutions introduced by conceptual prototypes or high-end, niche products, often 
trickle-down to lower lines aimed at a broader audience (see exhibit 8).  New seasonal collections at Swatch emerge from a multiple-level evaluation of proposals from the design group. However, 
collections “Vendome” and “Spiga”, sold exclusively in France and Italy respectively, provide designers at Swatch Lab 
with a space to experiment variations in shapes, patterns and materials, while regular collections will include less daring, 
more saleable versions.  At Bang & Olufsen, internal designers belonging to an organizational unit called “Idealand” collaborate with designer 
David Lewis to autonomously explore new product concepts. Ideas are then passed on to the development unit for an 
assessment of technical feasibility. Development engineers are pushed to look for creative solutions for overcoming them, 
before proposing alterations or rejection due to technical problems.   In 1989, discomforted designers at Sony Design Center autonomously developed a series of concepts, code-named Spirit, 
that were meant to reinterpret the older values of design at Sony: craftsmanship, integrity and simplicity. Their results 
became a “genetic blueprint” for the following generations of Sony products. 
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 Table 4. Phase two: Evaluation and selection of ideas 
The role of managers Examples 
Implement a consistent 
product policy, providing 
strategic coherence to the 
stream of new products. 
 Turnaround at Apple was facilitated by the dramatic reduction of developmental projects – from 350 to 10 in a few years – 
operated by Gil Amelio and, later, by Steve Jobs. Jobs concentrated efforts on fewer but more promising projects and 
articulated clear product strategies, where peculiar design would stress and reinforce product positioning. He explicitly 
connected new product development to its main target audience: consumers and professionals. A rigorous 
“conceptualization” phase at the beginning of product development was instituted, encouraging designers to clearly spell 
out the goals of the project and to identify a precise target for the product (see exhibit 1).  At Bang & Olufsen, historically, no idea coming from the design centre was ever refused, regardless of costs or commercial 
viability. In 1992, on the verge of bankruptcy, new CEO Anders Knutsen refused a proposal for a new loudspeaker, 
sending a shockwave through the company but re-establishing the pre-eminence of business over artistic concerns.  In Italian “design factories”, design managers like Alberto Alessi and Ernesto Gismondi personally supervise the product 
development process and usually have the final word on proposals. Coherence within brands and product lines largely lie 
on their personal taste, vision and sensitivity. 
 
Adopt portfolio logic, 
assessing each idea in light of 
its contribution to the 
renewal process. 
 In the Zanussi division of the Electrolux group, so-called “flagship products”, such as the Oz refrigerator or the Jetsy 
washing machines, are intend primarily to contribute to brand positioning. Their development often enjoys preferential 
funding and faster procedures (see exhibit 8).  At Artemide, CEO Ernesto Gismondi has supported the development of highly original products such as the 
Metamorfosis collection, which were not really expected to sell more than a few hundred pieces a year, but attracted media 
coverage, reaped design awards and added to the prestige of the company. Some products have also been kept in the 
catalogue long after their commercial potential was exploited, as they are meant to qualify the overall image of the portfolio 
of products.   Alberto Alessi periodically encourages projects such as Richard Sapper’s The Orion Belt or Tea & Coffee Piazza for which 
commercial concerns are secondary. None of these projects is really expected to encounter commercial success. These 
projects, however, are meant to contribute to the development of the company as they explore new product typologies and 
new productive techniques. These projects are also credited for having gradually brought about cultural changes in the 
company and helped enrich its brand image (see exhibit 4). 
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Table 5. Phase three: Revision of the design philosophy  
The role of managers Examples 
Maintain alertness to 
environmental signals. 
 The unexpected success of Nokia 2110 brought managers to reconsider product and brand policies, in order to address 
more forcefully the latent demand for more stylish, personalized products (see exhibit 5).   During the eighties, product development at Bang & Olufsen emphasized costly integration between all audio and video 
sources. Increasing average prices eventually led to sales decline. Later, market research revealed that system integration 
was not perceived to be a central benefit of Bang & Olufsen’s products, leading to the development of stand-alone 
products like Beosound Century (see exhibit 7).   During the seventies, plastic had come to be perceived as a cheap, uncool, polluting material. In early nineties, the success 
of experimental products, such as Philippe Starck’s Dr. Glob chair, which used sophisticated surface treatment and 
colouring, was interpreted by Kartell’s managers as a sign of an unexploited market niche. The product portfolio was 
rapidly reconfigured following the new strategy to combine creative design with exquisite finishing and outstanding 
technical properties. 
 
Stimulate reflection on the 
validity of current style and 
concepts. 
 At Oticon, facing lagging sales in traditional, cumbersome, awkward-looking behind-the-ear products, the new CEO Lars 
Kolind challenged the entrenched engineering-driven philosophy of product developers and encouraged them to be more 
sensitive to how the design of a hearing aid affected its perceived value (see exhibit 6).  At Sony, new CEO Nobuyuki Idei, former head of the Design Center, encouraged a shift in design philosophy of the 
company, from what he termed “analog thinking” to “digital thinking”. The new principles pointed at the need to establish 
a dialog with users, and to anticipate future convergence of product categories around the same digital information 
support.  Launched in 1995, the “Human Light” project was triggered by the perceived threat of commoditization of designers’ 
lamps. Artemide’s CEO Ernesto Gismondi gathered a team of well-known designers to explore new design approaches 
centred on the light itself, rather than the lamp. The project eventually led to twelve seminal products – the Metamorfosis 
collection – that, thanks to an innovative technology based on combined adjustable light sources, used light as a 
“construction material” to produce effects of high emotional impact. 
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Table 6. Phase four: Diffusion of new principles  
The role of managers Examples 
Encourage the embodiment 
of the new philosophy in 
formal statements and 
managerial tools. 
 Since mid nineties, Stefano Marzano, chief design manager at Philips, has elaborated and widely communicated the new 
philosophy of the design centre, summarized in the concept of High Design (see table 1). Core tenets of the new 
philosophy (People-focus, research-based, sustainability, etc.) have been exposed in speeches, writings and internal 
documents (i.e. “Vision Statement for Sustainable Design Directions”) and now permeate work at Philips Design.   In 1993, Bang & Olufsen’s New Vision – “a unique combination of technological excellence and emotional appeal” – was 
meant to synthesize the essence of the brand as well as the core competences (micro-mechanics, choice of materials, design, 
etc.) that designers, product developers and marketers were expected to leverage upon (see exhibit 7).   In 1991, pushed by his brothers, Alberto Alessi tried to formalize the principles that had successfully guided his evaluation 
of new product ideas in the previous decade. Alessi’s “success formula” was formally adopted as a guide and support to the 
collective evaluation of the proposals received by the company (see exhibit 3). 
 
Promote awareness of design 
philosophy and brand 
identity among peripheral 
actors (distributors, 
salespersons, etc.) and 
customers. 
 In late nineties, brand managers at Zanussi used the Oz refrigerator to align brand positioning around Europe, and to signal 
brand values to customers, distributors and the media (see exhibit 8).   In 1996, the Match Point training program was aimed at ensuring that all the independent retailers selling Bang & Olufsen’s 
products understood the philosophy behind the products and were able to convey it effectively to the customers. The 
essential mission of marketing activities was redefined: the key task became “to make sure that the distribution chain all the 
way through to the customer gets the same message.” A test purchasing program was implemented in order to monitor 
actual dealer behaviour and, develop a range of loyal and specialized dealers. A comprehensive program of training and 
visits saw more than 600 dealers visiting the headquarters and participating to a training course which demonstrated new 
products and explained the selection and rejection of functions in the development of Bang & Olufsen’s product concepts 
in terms of design philosophy and core competencies.   At Artemide, the Human Light project eventually led to “The Human Light Manifesto”: a public statement of brand values 
rooted in principles inspiring product design, which underlay the company’s effort to provide “flexible” and “adaptable” 
sources of light to accompany people in their daily activities and to provide “physical pleasure and mental comfort” in 
different “contexts of life”. The statement emphasized the revised design philosophy as well as the revolutionary 
technology for computer-controlled manipulation of light incorporated in new product lines. Mono-brand concept stores 
would present products in real life situations, emphasizing the integration between light and human activity.  
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Table 7. Design Principles at Bang & Olufsen, The Seven CIC (excerpt) 
  Authenticity  
 
“The best sound or picture reproduction is that which comes closest to reality – as 
experienced by the human being and not by a measuring instrument.”  Autovisuality “The company’s products must provide for immediate understanding of their capabilities and 
manner of operation. Things should be what they look like they are.”   Credibility “In products, dealing and action. Product specifications must be given as minimum data to which every apparatus must conform.”  Domesticity “Products are designed to be used by people in their homes. They must be problem-free and 
easy to operate – even though they are technically advanced. Technology is for the benefit of 
people and not the reverse.”  Essentiality “The products must be conceptbearing. Design should be focused on the essentials of the 
concept. We must simplify and avoid whims and fancies that have nothing to do with the real 
purpose.”  Individuality “Bang & Olufsen is an alternative to the mass-producing giants of the trade. The company 
develops, manufactures and markets for the people who place greater demands on quality ad 
individuality than the average user.”  Inventiveness “New approaches to solving practical tasks should characterise the company and its products. 
As a small company, we cannot carry out basic research in the electronic area, but we can 
implement the newest technology with creativity and inventiveness.” 
 
Figure 1. Design philosophy as a mediator between strategy, capabilities and brand.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Intent 
Brand image 
Design Philosophy  Core design principles  Stylistic identity 
Core capabilities 
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Table 8 Design-driven strategic renewal: key managerial tasks and common pitfalls  
 Phases Key managerial tasks Common pitfalls 
 
 
 
 
Product  
development phases 
 
 
Generation of ideas  
  Emphasize the strategic relevance of design with 
substantial and symbolic action.   Encourage and shelter the autonomous 
development of designers’ ideas.   Preserve the integrity of product concepts from 
pre-mature interference from other functions. 
 
  Involving designers late in new 
product development.   Relegating designers to the role 
of mere stylists.   Allowing sales and production 
managers excessive influence 
over the work of designers. 
Evaluation and 
selection of ideas 
 Implement a consistent product policy: provide 
strategic coherence to the stream of new 
products.  Adopt portfolio logic, assessing each idea in light 
of its contribution to the renewal process. 
 
 Rubberstamping designers’ 
ideas.  Letting projects proliferate 
without a strategy.  
 
 
Organizational  
development phases 
Re-evaluation of the 
design philosophy 
 Maintain alertness to environmental signals.  Stimulate reflection on the current validity of 
style and concepts. 
 Lack of alertness to signals from 
the environment.  Lack of willingness to question 
goals, values and principles. 
 
Diffusion of new ideas  Encourage the embodiment of the new 
philosophy in formal statements and managerial 
tools.  Promote awareness of design philosophy and 
brand identity among peripheral actors 
(distributors, salespersons, etc.) and customers. 
 Unclear indications to external 
designers and advertisers  Inconsistent sales behaviour.  
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Table 9. Core design principles: some examples 
Apple (personal computers)  User-friendliness  Elegant simplicity  Emotional appeal 
 
Alessi (household goods)  Design should address need for art and poetry 
(design as “commercial art”)   Design should connect with collective imagery  Design should “encourage dreams” rather than 
satisfy needs   Alessi mediates between the best international 
designers, the society and the market 
 
Swatch (wristwatches)  Constant change   Provocation   Affordability 
 
Philips (appliances, electronics)  Design should be aimed at improving quality of 
life and try to restore the balance in the natural, 
social and cultural environment  Design should be based on research and 
incorporate multi-disciplinary perspectives  Design should help businesses in generating 
solutions able to stimulate new social behaviour 
 
 
Table 10. Stylistic identity: some examples, late nineties  
Bang & Olufsen (consumer electronics) 
Sober, elegant shapes; satin, matte surfaces, anodised 
zinc and aluminium.  
 
Kartell (furniture) 
Pastel and translucent hues; sophisticated textures 
and finishing; plastic as core material, occasionally 
combined with other materials (aluminium, wood, 
etc.)  
Electrolux (home appliances, Zanussi brand)  
Rounded shapes, curved handles, large knobs and 
dials; pastel hues, brightly coloured details, stylish 
graphics. 
 
Swatch (wristwatches) 
Narrow range of standard shapes based on a round 
case; always changing colours, patterns and 
materials. 
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Appendix A 
The conceptual model presented in this paper is based on evidence collected in the course of a 
research project carried out at Bocconi University and SDA Bocconi School of Management. Our 
study focused on companies in traditional and high-tech industries. Among the former, we 
selected companies that are considered outstanding innovators in style, concepts and materials in 
their respective industries: Alessi (household goods), Artemide (lighting), Kartell (furniture). In 
the high-tech industries, we focused on companies who emphasize the formal and symbolic 
aspects of product design, often introducing substantial innovations in product concepts: Apple 
(personal computers), Bang & Olufsen (audio-video equipment), Electrolux (white goods), Nokia 
(mobile phones), Oticon (medical devices), Philips (small appliances), Sony (consumer 
electronics), and Swatch (wrist watches). Our research was based on longitudinal case studies and 
investigated the way the design process is connected with the process of strategy formation. We 
examined how design and designers affected or were affected by broader strategic decisions and 
we investigated the way designers interacted with managers along the process of new product 
development. Data collection relied on different sources: interviews with managers and 
designers, annual reports and brochures, in-house magazines and other internal communication 
tools, internal reports and documents, web sites and other corporate communication tools, 
corporate biographies and other archival material. Based on a comparative analysis of the 
interaction between designers and managers across different companies and in different strategic 
situations, we developed an interpretive framework for understanding how design and designers 
may contribute to strategic renewal. The analysis of patterns of success and failure helped us 
identify critical issues to be addressed in different phases of the process. Successive rounds of 
data collection, and iteration between theory and data helped us refine our emerging 
interpretations. 
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Appendix B 
The notion of design philosophy is central to our model. We may conceive the design philosophy as 
a sort of “genetic blueprint” of product development: a set of shared beliefs influencing designers’ 
decisions about how a product will look and function. Conceptually speaking, a design philosophy is 
made of two related components: a set of core design principles and a stylistic identity. In essence, 
core design principles are more or less explicit guidelines for designers, aimed at ensuring that all 
products commercialized by a company or under a certain brand share certain distinctive conceptual 
and functional features (see Table 9 for some examples). A design philosophy may build on rare 
technological capabilities – like mechanical micro-movements or human-system interface for Bang & 
Olufsen, development and treatment of plastics at Kartell, or psycho-acoustics at hearing-aid 
producer Oticon – or on a distinctive way of managing the design process itself. In fact, effective 
design principles may be embodied in few simple rules that shape the design process. For instance, 
since its foundation in 1961, the Sony Design Center has followed simple, yet powerful, principles 
laid down by co-founder Masaru Ibuka. The implications of these principles on product policies have 
been tremendous. An inner push to “always do what has never been done before” has led to an 
impressive array of “first products” in consumer electronics – including the first tape recorder, the 
first portable transistor radio, the first home-video system, the first portable stereo cassette player, 
and the first home CD player. By translating in practice Ibuka’s incitement to “always lead and never 
follow," designers at Sony did not let themselves be constrained by market research indicating what 
consumers wanted, but tried to envision totally new possibilities of consumption. 
---------------------------------- 
insert table 9 about here 
---------------------------------- 
The concept of stylistic identity, instead, refers to a unique and distinctive combination of shapes, 
colours and patterns, and materials that characterise a company’s products, distinguish them from 
competitors’, and make them immediately recognisable31 (see table 10 for some examples). Style is 
indeed one the most visible form of differentiation and helps communicate the distinctive principles 
that underlie product design. An original style may influence the perception of a product or a brand 
as unique and distinctive and help establish or reinforce reputation as product innovator. Product re-
styling may reinforce or alter the perception of a brand, as it stimulates associations (fun, 
performance, style, reliability, environmental-friendliness, entertainment, poetry, etc.) relevant for 
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certain target groups32. The conceptual and technological diversity of Apple products, for instance, 
has been often underlined by original combinations of colour, shapes and surface treatment. Since 
the very beginning, Apple computers were designed to emphasise ease of use, both in the way they 
worked and in the way they looked. The anthropomorphic shapes of most Macintosh series – the 
upward tilt and the characteristic protruding “chin”, the tiny plastic feet of Macintosh LC, the 
“breathing” vents – were meant to establish a personal, emotional connection between the user and 
the machine, and to support the overall perception of the brand as “user-friendly.” Recently, the 
curved shapes, translucent plastic and bright colours of the iMac and iBook series emphasized from a 
visual point of view the way the company, and by transitive property its users, had been perceived 
for years – original, different, expressive, unconventional. 
---------------------------------- 
insert table 10 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Just like core principles, unique identities may rest on capabilities of a technological nature. Kartell, a 
producer of plastic furniture and household products is illustrative of this case. Founded in 1949 to 
produce plastic equipment for the car industry, Kartell soon extended its product range to household 
goods, lighting, furniture, and laboratory equipment. In the sixties and the seventies, Kartell was at 
the forefront of the experimentation and innovation in plastic technologies, reaching exceptional 
technical and aesthetic qualities, and winning several industrial design awards. In the eighties, 
however, loss of inspiration, stagnant demand, low productivity, and the deteriorating image of 
plastic – increasingly considered a poor, polluting and unfashionable material – brought Kartell to 
the edge of bankruptcy. The turnaround strategy that brought the company back in black in early 
'90s streamlined the product range, focusing on specific and related product categories (chairs, tables, 
stools, etc.), and capitalised on unique capabilities for the treatment of polypropylene, polystyrene 
and polyethylene surfaces and colouring. The new philosophy emphasized innovation in colours 
(introducing new pastel hues, beside the traditional red, white and black), textures (satin, transparent, 
translucent) and shapes. International talents, such as Philippe Starck, Ron Arad and Antonio 
Citterio, were offered the possibility to express their innovative ideas through Kartell’s unique 
competencies in moulding, bending and finishing plastics.  
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